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a series of explanatory variables reveals that over 40% of this elasticity can be explained by the permanent 
incomes of the two generations. Each of education and preferences separately account for about 20%, and 
previous intergenerational transfers for about 13%. When permanent income is controlled for, the contribution of 
savings preferences is around 13%. The transmission of preferences therefore plays a non-negligible role in the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth inequalities, but is far from being the most important factor. 
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1 "My Father Was Right" is the title of a play (and a film) by Sacha Guitry: “I was like you and you will be like 
me. My father was right”. I would like to thank Andrew Clark and Amédéo Spadaro for their detailed comments. 
This paper is part of a research programme on savers’ preferences carried out jointly with André Masson. I am 
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Are our own values also those of our ancestors? Does reality get mixed up with the 
etymology of the word patrimony ("goods of the father")? Just how much of our wealth do we 
“owe” to our parents? In Economics, these very broad questions fed a famous controversy in 
the 1980s between the "father" of the life-cycle hypothesis, Franco Modigliani, and one of his 
young colleagues, Larry Kotlikoff (see Kessler and Masson, 1989). The Nobel Prize winner 
of 1986 put forward the figure of 20% for this correlation, as against that of 80% claimed by 
his opponent. Commenting on this debate, Blinder (1988) criticised the over-wide definition 
of inherited wealth used by Kotlikoff (which included in particular all of the cost of 
education) and noted ironically that in the end all that we are is inherited: "Where would I be 
without my genes?"  
Without going to quite these extremes, this debate did bring up a number of interesting 
questions about the intergenerational transmission of inequality. Are “Daddy’s Boys” just as 
rich as Daddy?2 And if they are, what explains this phenomenon? Do well-off parents invest 
more in the human capital of their children, which education consequently allows the latter to 
enjoy higher incomes and save more? Do they transfer more wealth directly to their children 
via donations or inheritance? Does parents’ wealth serve as collateral for their children’s 
borrowing, thereby easing capital constraints? Do both generations have the same savings 
preferences? Answering these questions requires us to both measure and explain the 
intergenerational correlation in wealth. 
The broad question of the transmission of various attributes has inspired a lively literature 
in Economics, driven to an extent by the availability of data allowing parents and their 
children to be observed contemporaneously. One strand of this literature has considered the 
correlation between the income of parents and their children (Blanden et al., 2004 and 2007). 
More generally, intergenerational transmission can be applied to any number of different 
behaviours or outcomes, such as fertility (Lochner 2008), union status (Blanden and Machin, 
2003), divorce (Amato, 1996), domestic violence (Ehrensaft et al., 2003) or gender role (Farre 
and Vella, 2007)… 
This paper contributes to this literature, but applied to a domain that has attracted perhaps 
less interest: the intergenerational instillation of preferences even more so. Moreover, we are 
able to relate this preference correlation to similarities in a number of outcome variables, such 
as income, education, and portfolio choice. As far as we are aware, this is one of the first 
papers to combine the transmission of outcomes with the transmission of preferences.  
To do so, we appeal to data from a unique French dataset collected by DELTA and TNS-
Sofres in 2002, in which we have information on both wealth and individual characteristics 
for two to three co-existing generations. More fundamentally, using a battery of different 
                                                
2 In Schumpeter (edition of 1972), for example, the rich are characterised by a hotel or a bus "always full, but 
always full of different people".  
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questions, we are able to measure attitudes with respect to risk and time of both parents and 
their children, and therefore calculate the similarity across generations with respect to these 
two savings preferences, and thus evaluate the extent to which this similarity explains the 
intergenerational correlation in wealth.  
The paper is organised as follows. The first section outlines the context in which the 
article is situated. We then briefly present the survey which allows us to measure savers’ risk 
and time preference using the methodology developed in Arrondel et al. (2004). Before 
considering the intergenerational correlation in wealth, we will take a detour via the same 
correlation in preferences. 
 
I. The intergenerational transmission of wealth inequality: goals and measures 
This article contributes to the literature on wealth inequalities and their transfer between 
generations, as well as the resulting implications for redistributive policies. A key element in 
this debate is how to measure inequality and its after-effects. 
I.1. The contours of the debate 
Intergenerational mobility has been the subject of particular controversy for the entire 
19th and 20th centuries, with the two extremes being represented by those in favour of a free 
market, and those inspired by Marxist thought. The former called for substantial social 
mobility and the equality of opportunity, in order to render the Economy as efficient as 
possible. The latter argued along the same lines, but in order to fight against the social 
reproduction of inequality (Piketty, 2000).3 Many consider this ideological opposition now 
outdated, and have adopted more moderate positions on the optimal degree of social mobility. 
Part of the debate has then moved on to the measure of the inequalities in question. 
The measure of the transmission of inequality between generations is an old problem. 
Galton (who invented the term "regression") was already working on the intergenerational 
transmission of height at the end of the 19th century (1889). The first work on the 
transmission of resources, carried out for the most part in the United States, most often 
revealed only a weak correlation between the social status of children and their parents (Blau 
& Duncan, 1967, Bowles & Gintis, 2002). In the middle of the 1980s, Becker & Tomes 
(1986) and Berhrman & Taubman (1985) estimated for example that the intergenerational 
                                                
3 Regarding inheritances, Lepage (1985), a noted free-marketeer, wrote that "The great virtue of property and 
competition is to ensure that scarce resources are permanently directed to those who know best how to use 
them". Bertaux (1977) is a perfect example of the "socialist" position when he talks of the "financial oligarchy": 
"When we left Lyon, we had to make sure that we would find a relay with fresh horses every ten leagues. In the 
same way we can conceive the course of capital over the centuries as a series of stages in which the horses are 
the capitalists who are ridden by the capital. And their children are the horses of the following". 
3 
elasticity of income and wages was only around 0.15-0.20.4 In other words, parents who 
earned a dollar more than did the average of their generation had children who received at 
most 20 cents more than the average of theirs. These relatively old estimates, which are 
thought to suffer from a number of biases, have now been revised upwwards. A recent 
thorough survey by Mulligan (1997) proposed a figure of 0.68 for the intergenerational 
elasticity of consumption, with corresponding figures of 0.43, 0.34, and 0.29 for income, 
wages and number of years of schooling respectively. 
In the context of the current paper, we now consider household wealth and its 
intergenerational transmission. 
 
I.2. Wealth: Like Father Like Son? 
The empirical literature has appealed to a number of different methods to explain wealth 
inequalities between households (inequality indices, calibration models, econometrics, and 
simulation methods, to name just some). At the most basic level, we can contrast 
macroeconomic quantitative approaches to those of a more microeconomic inspiration. 
Most of the macroeconomic work which has tried to calibrate intergenerational models 
(under uncertainty) based on an initial homogeneous population to recreate the observed 
distribution of wealth has systematically run into the problem of the richest segment of the 
population (Castaneda et al., 2003): it is at best difficult, if not impossible, to correctly mimic 
the top end of the wealth distribution from standard savings theories (i.e. the life-cycle 
hypothesis expanded to include wealth transfers). Nonetheless, if we imagine that individuals 
do not have the same preferences regarding saving, the gap between the simulated and the real 
distributions shrinks (Krusell & Smith, 1998). 
Along the same lines, micro-econometric work on household wealth accumulation only 
explains a small part of the dispersion of the latter. In France, for example, the household 
characteristics put forward by standard savings theory only explain at the most around half of 
the variance in observed wealth. Again, appealing to agent heterogeneity vis-à-vis saving 
preferences improves the model fit (Arrondel et al., 2004).5 
                                                
4 Becker (1988) affirms as much in his American Economic Association presidential address: "…low earnings as 
well high earnings are not strongly transmitted from father to sons…" (p. 10). 
5 Americk et al. (2003) propose another dimension of preferences – the "propensity to plan" – in order to explain 
savings behaviours. Venti and Wise (2001) are more radical, proposing to distinguish, in household accumulated 
savings for retirement, the part that results from factors outside of the household’s control (chance) from that 
which results from its own decisions (choice), which latter reflects household preferences. The effect of the 
"chance" factor is evaluated via a regression of wealth on a set of variables which are assumed to represent 
chance (inheritances and gifts received, but also "demographic" variables in the broad sense of the term: marital 
status, family composition, health, and so on). These regressions have, unsurprisingly, only limited explanatory 
power; the unexplained part of wealth (around 85%) is then allocated in its totality to agents’  decisions (choice). 
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To further develop the explanation of the household distribution of wealth, it may well be 
useful to back up and consider the influence of parents’ savings behaviour on that of their 
children. Existing empirical work has found a substantial intergenerational correlation in 
savings behaviours, in a regression framework, with respect to the amount and type of wealth, 
as well as the transmission of wealth to one’s children. 
Research on portfolio choice in France, has shown that the probability of owning shares 
rises by 50% if the individual’s parents were also shareholders (Arrondel & Masson, 2003a). 
Equally, individuals are more likely to hold life assurance policies if their parents did so as 
well (Arrondel & Masson, 2003b). Regarding wealth transmission, those who have 
themselves inherited are more likely to pass wealth on to their children, and the probability of 
writing a will is greater when the individual’s parents had written one. Arrondel & Grange 
(2006) use 19th Century data to show that the transmission of wealth of one Franc over the 
generational mean is associated with children’s transmission of wealth that is 40 to 50 
centimes greater than their generational mean. Arrondel & Masson (2006) estimate, from a 
number of different surveys, that individuals who have received a donation are twice as likely 
to give one themselves, and that the probability of helping one’s children financially is 50% 
higher for individuals who were gift beneficiaries themselves. The challenge is then to explain 
these similarities in behaviours between generations: do these reflect the transmission of 
preferences or of information, financial education, or something else? 
In other countries, the empirical literature on intergenerational wealth transmission is 
more scant, probably due to the lack of suitable data. Harbury & Hitchens (1979) and 
Menchik (1979) consider the relationship between wealth inheritance and that left to one’s 
children by rich individuals in the UK and the US respectively. They obtain elasticities of 
0.50 for the British and around 0.70 for Americans. Mulligan (1997) finds an 
intergenerational wealth elasticity of 0.32 to 0.43 in American data on co-existing 
generations, i.e. before any transmission of wealth has taken place. Again using American 
data, Chiteji & Stafford (2000) analyse the intergenerational similarity in portfolios, and 
Hurst & Lusardi (2004) consider the effect of parents’ wealth on the children’s probability of 
becoming self-employed. Both underline the influence of parents on their children’s savings 
behaviour. Knowles & Postlewaite (2005) also find a significant effect of parents’ saving on 
the savings rate of their children. 
Last, Charles & Hurst (2003) use a number of different waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate that the intergenerational elasticity of wealth, before 
transmission, of two co-existing generations is 0.37. They also ask whether this similarity 
comes from the intergenerational correlation of earnings, education, or preferences. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Any interaction between the two types of factors is not taken into consideration. Venti and Wise conclude that: 
"… the bulk of the dispersion must be attributed to differences to in the amount that households choose to save". 
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We wish to carry out a similar analysis on French data. Why should we be interested in 
the wealth profiles of two co-existing generations when we have emphasised the key role 
played by inheritances in wealth inequality? However, this transmission from parents 
increasingly occurs at later points in the life cycle (at an average age of 47 in 2000), so that it 
is of interest to ask if, and if so why, parents and their children show such contemporaneously 
similar savings behaviour. Does the inheritance of wealth go hand in hand with the 
inheritance of preferences? 
 
II. The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey: Three Generations of Respondents 
The data used in the current analysis were collected in 2002 by DELTA, in collaboration 
with TNS-Sofres, using a representative sample of households whose head was aged between 
35 and 55 (the "Lifestyles and Savings" survey). The originality of this survey, which 
explains the restriction on the age of the household head, so that they were more likely to 
have parents who were still alive and independent children, consists in interviewing two 
generations of the same family (Arrondel & Masson, 2007). The main aim of the survey, 
using a series of quantitative and qualitative questions, was to measure individual attitudes 
regarding both risk and time preferences, as well as a number of values and opinions 
concerning social relations, equity and social justice. 
 
II.1. The "Lifestyles and Savings" Survey and the Constitution of the Parents-Children Survey 
The first phase of this survey concerned the main respondents, who were aged between 
35 and 55; this produced 2 460 usable responses (out of 4 000 attempted interviews, giving a 
response rate of 63%).6 This first phase, apart from its role in collecting survey information, 
allowed us to identify respondents’ parents and children (of which we identified 1 141). 
Survey information in this first phase covered seven different themes: 1) Work, professional 
career, and income; 2) Investments and money management; 3) Retirement; 4) The family 
and intergenerational transfers; 5) Health and the management of health capital; 6) 
Consumption, leisure and travel; and 7) Other themes. The questions in this survey aimed to 
collect information on both the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the 
household, notably with respect to income and wealth, as well as their preference parameters. 
An additional advantage of this survey is that it picks up information that is only rarely 
collected in the French Wealth ("Patrimoine") surveys, such as health, religious education, 
political opinions, and the possession of durable goods. 
                                                
6 The first phase of this postal survey was carried out between May 14th and July 3rd 2002, and the second phase 
between the 13th of June and the 22nd of July. 
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The second phase of the survey covered the parents and children of the first-phase 
respondents. This produced information on 199 parents and 241 children (for a response rate 
of 39%). The questions asked of parents and children in the second phase were identical to 
those asked of the respondents in the first phase. Table A1 in the Appendix describes the three 
samples: the respondents aged between 35 and 55, their parents and their children.7 We 
therefore have information on 440 parent-children pairs, which we can use to analyse 
intergenerational relationships. 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the two generations (parents and their children) in 
our sample. The children are on average just under 34 years old, while their parents are on 
average about 59 years old. There is only little difference in household labour earnings: 
around 26 000 Euros for children, compared to 27 700 Euros for their parents. There is a 
substantial difference in education between the generations, with children being twice as 
likely to be graduates as their parents. The gap in wealth between the two generations is also 
large: over 192 000 Euros for the parents, but less than half of that amount for their children.8 
This naturally reflects the different position of the two generations in the life cycle, notably 
with respect to housing: around 44% of children own property, as against 68.6% of parents. 
On the other hand, the rate of risky-asset ownership is similar (30%) across the generations. 
 
II.2 Measuring Preferences: A Scoring Method 
The standard theory of saving is that of the life cycle introduced by Modigliani (1986), 
which assumes the exponential discounting of future utility levels, and relies on expected 
utility with respect to risk. This theory requires only two preference parameters to explain 
savings behaviour: risk aversion and time preference (Arrondel & Masson, 2007). In the 
simplest versions of the model, there is a clear division of labour: the consumption/savings 
choice depends only on time preferences, which determines the global level of wealth over 
the life cycle, while risk aversion only affects portfolio choice. 
In this theoretical set-up, wealth only serves to smooth consumption over the individual’s 
life cycle (by foresight) and as a precautionary measure in the face of an uncertain future 
                                                
7 The first-phase respondents are designed to be representative of the French population aged between 35 and 55. 
They are equally divided by sex, two-thirds are married, one-quarter have the baccalauréat and one-third over the 
baccalauréat level, and one-third earn less than 14 400 Euros per year. Sixty percent of the respondents’ parents 
(who are aged over 50) were women, and were more likely to be widows or widowers than were the respondents 
(25% against 2%) and were less educated (18% have education over the baccalauréat level, against 33.7% of 
first-phase respondents). Children, who were aged under 40, were naturally more likely to be single than were 
the first-phase respondents, were better educated, but earned less than did the other two generations. Two thirds 
of those in the children’s database were women. 
8 Both financial and global wealth were measured in bands in the survey. We have reconstructed continuous 
wealth values using the method of simulated residuals, first for financial assets, and then, conditional on these 
assets, for total wealth (Gouriéroux et al., 1987, and Lollivier and Verger, 1989).  
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(Kimball, 1990). Generalising the model to allow for intergenerational transmissions makes 
wealth also depend on the degree of altruism (Becker, 1991).  
Starting from the INSEE "Patrimoine 1998" survey, we have developed an original 
approach to measuring individual risk and time preferences, as described in Arrondel et al. 
(2004) and Arrondel & Masson (2008). This method is based on an individual questionnaire 
including a wide variety of questions covering different life dimensions (consumption, 
leisure, health, investments, work, retirement, family, etc.) which take many different forms, 
from the seemingly superficial (taking an umbrella in case of rain, parking in no-parking 
zones) to the more traditional (lottery questions), to more serious outcomes (such as health, 
retirement and the environment). This questionnaire allows us to calculate qualitative scores 
for each respondent regarding their attitude to risk, their degree of long-term foresight, and 
their altruism (with respect to their descendants). 
Each of these three preferences is measured by a certain number of questions; some of the 
latter, more polysemous in nature, apply to more than one preference (for example to both ! 
and ", which denote risk-aversion and time preference respectively). The replies to each 
question are assigned a numerical score (with respect to ",  −1 = lacking foresight, 0 = a 
middle position, and +1 = provident). The sum of these grades for each individual produces a 
total score, where this sum is calculated only using the items which, ex post, form a 
statistically coherent whole (according to Cronbach’s alpha, which drops the questions that 
contribute the least to the whole). The resulting qualitative and ordinal scores are "average" 
measures which summarise the individual’s responses to a wide variety of questions.  
This methodology has been shown to be both relevant and operational for the 
measurement of individual preferences and savings behaviour (Arrondel & Masson, 2007). In 
particular the results have shown that, ceteris paribus, the least risk-averse are younger, 
single, educated, male, high-income, and with parents who were either company directors or 
self-employed. The far-sighted are older, married with children, and educated. The preference 
scores are significantly correlated with wealth, in the expected direction: being more prudent 
(a high value of !) or more far-sighted (a low value of ") is associated with greater amounts of 
wealth, as are higher values of family altruism. Household wealth thus appears in its multi-
faceted form: precautionary saving, saving for old age, and saving for one’s family.9 
This preference-measurement methodology via scores is here applied (with fewer 
questions) to the 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres survey (see the Appendix). The set of questions 
used for the construction of these scores was determined using the first-phase respondents 
                                                
9 The decomposition of the distribution of wealth using the Theil indicator reveals that the preference parameters 
have a joint explanatory power of the order of 10 to 15%, which is greater than that accruing to variables such as 
social origin, education, household type, town size, and liquidity constraints; only the classic determinants of 
wealth (age, income, social class, and inheritance) do better. 
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(i.e. those aged between 35 and 55), who constitute a representative sample. As our goal here 
is to compare the preferences of different generations, the preference scores of children and 
parents were constructed in the same way as those of the first-phase respondents, without 
judging their intrinsic coherence (Arrondel & Masson, 2007). The distributions of the 
different scores across generations are depicted in Figures 1a to 1c. 
 
III. The Transmission of Tastes: "You shall be a saver, my boy" 
Economists have only relatively recently turned to the endogeneity of tastes and the 
dynamics of preferences. Opening this black box is nonetheless of great interest for a number 
of reasons: to better understand how individual tastes come about (preferences are most often 
imposed ad hoc in Economics models); and to analyse the phenomena of social mobility and 
the cultural transmission of inequality. 
Cultural transmission would seem to play a key role in the formation of preferences such 
as risk-aversion, time-preference and altruism. Bisin and Verdier (2005) note that in the 
Economic literature, this is modelled as a direct transmission via the family ("vertical 
socialisation" by nature and nurture), and a more indirect transmission via social relations and 
education ("horizontal and oblique socialisation"). We are here interested in the first of these 
dimensions.  
In the first instance, when we ask households about the financial education that they 
received from their parents, or that they gave to their children, the great majority confess to a 
partisan approach to savings attitudes. More than three-quarters of first-phase respondents say 
that their parents "tried to teach them to spend less and to save more". Symmetrically, more 
than nine out of ten (93%) say that they themselves frequently encouraged their children to 
save. 
This cultural transmission has not however inspired a particularly large literature. Jellal & 
Wolff (2002) propose a quantitative analysis of the transmission of cultural characteristics 
relating to altruism. Knowles & Postlewaite (2005) find that the propensity to plan for the 
future is transmitted from parents to their children. Charles & Hurst (2003) consider the 
transmission of risk preferences (using the lotteries in Barsky et al., 1997: see below), and 
find a statistically significant relationship. Dohmen et al. (2006) come to the same conclusion 
with respect to intergenerational risk-transmission, here measured using the answers to 
qualitative scales.  
Our analysis of the correlation between parents’ preferences and those of their children 
will use the scores described above with respect to risk, time preference and altruism 
calculated for the three samples: first-phase respondents, their parents and their children. 
9 
These scores are directly comparable as they have been constructed in the same way using the 
same questions for the three different generations. 
 
III.1. The  Intergenerational Correlation in Savers’ Preferences 
Tables 2a and 2b present the intergenerational correlation in our three preference scores. 
These correlations are statistically significant for all of risk, time-preference and altruism 
attitudes. The correlation seems to be the strongest with respect to risk (0.22), followed by 
time preference (around 0.15) and altruism (around 0.11). The same hierarchy prevails when 
we instead calculate rank correlations in Table 2b, which are more appropriate for this kind of 
variable: this produces values of 0.16 for risk, 0.10 for time preference, and 0.08 for family 
altruism.  
We can refine these estimates by considering only parents and children who themselves 
have children as well (which gives us roughly 250 three-generational families), which avoids 
a certain number of endogeneity problems: we might imagine for example that altruistic 
parents are likely to have more children. The correlations in this restricted sample are much 
larger, especially with respect to altruism: 0.30 for risk, and 0.19 for time preference and 
altruism. The rank correlations are also larger (at 0.22, 0.13 and 0.14 respectively). This 
underlines, particularly for altruism, that the similarity of family situations is essential for the 
similarity of preferences.  
With respect to risk preferences, another more orthodox indicator in the realm of career 
choice was initially proposed by Barsky et al. (1997) in the American "Health and Retirement 
Survey". This was also asked of all respondents in the DELTA-TNS-Sofres survey. By asking 
individuals to express their preferences over a series of lotteries over permanent incomes, it is 
possible to infer their relative risk aversion under certain hypotheses (maximisation of 
expected utility, temporally additive and isoelastic preferences), or rather to infer intervals in 
which the parameter γ  falls. The protocol consists in repeatedly asking the respondent if she 
would renounce her current income (which is supposed to be her permanent income) in favour 
of alternative contracts which appear as lotteries: with a 50% chance of doubling her income, 
and a 50% chance of having it cut by one third (contract A), by one half (contract B), or by 
one fifth (contract C). Contract C is therefore the most advantageous, followed by contracts A 
and then B.10  
Table 2c presents the distributions of the responses to this question across the two 
generations. We can immediately see that children are bolder than their parents, reflecting an 
                                                
10 Relative risk aversion is less than 1 if the individual successively accepts contracts A and B; it is between 1 
and 2 if she accepts A but refuses B; between 2 and 3.76 if she refuses A but accepts C; and finally greater than 
3.76 if she refuses both C and A. 
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age effect on risk attitudes that is often found in different circumstances (Arrondel et al., 
2004). Table 2c also shows the correlation between the lottery responses given by parents and 
their children. Charles & Hurst (2003) obtain a positive correlation in American households, 
but only for the children of parents who are particularly risk-loving: these children are 
effectively less likely to be risk-averse, and more likely to be tolerant of risk. Contrary to this 
finding, our data reveal no statistically significant correlation, even after correcting for the 
difference in age, between the risk-aversion of the two generations.11 
 
III.2. The Intergenerational Elasticity of Savers’ Preferences 
In order to establish more precisely the intergenerational correlation in preferences, we 
carry out a number of regressions on the child’s preference score, using that of the parents as 
a an explanatory variable. With a logarithmic specification, the estimated coefficient directly 
provides us with an estimate of the elasticity of children’s preferences relative to those of 
their parents (See Tables 3a and 3b). 
In a first series of regressions, we look at the relationship between the two generations’ 
preference scores, only controlling for children’s and parents’ ages.12 As preferences evolve 
systematically with age, we need to calculate our intergenerational transmission conditional 
on both respondents’ ages. The second set of regressions then also controls for permanent 
income and education in both generations. 
With respect to risk attitudes, the correlation between children’s’ and parents’ scores is 
0.25. This implies that the child of a parent who has the maximum risk score (+15) will have 
a risk score that is five and a half points higher than the child of a parent with the greatest 
risk-loving score (-7). The estimated elasticity is around 0.19, so that a parent who has a risk 
score one unit higher than the mean of his generation has children who have risk scores that 
are on average 0.19 units higher than the average score of the children’s generation. Within 
three-generation families, this elasticity is somewhat higher, at around 0.24. These figures are 
not greatly affected by the introduction of other parents’ or children’s characteristics (such as 
income or education), even though the explanatory power of the regression increases.  
The correlation between parents’ and children’s time-preference scores is somewhat 
lower (at 0.17): the child of a parent who is very improvident (with a score of +8) will have a 
time-preference score that is three points higher than a child of a far-sighted parent (with a 
                                                
11 This measure of relative risk aversion has been subject to a number of criticisms (See Arrondel & Masson, 
2008). The choice between different contracts may be too complicated and abstract for some respondents (the 
non-response rate is about 10% for this question). Further, the replies given will likely depend on the 
individual’s wealth: ceteris paribus, greater wealth provides greater protection against misfortune, and allows 
the individual to take greater risks over their income; but at a given level of wealth, riskier portfolios make 
certain income levels more attractive. 
12 Section IV describes how age and other variables are controlled for (in equations 1 and 2). 
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score of -9). The elasticity of children’s scores relative to those of their parents is 0.13. We 
can also see in this regression that a larger difference in age between parents and their 
children negatively affects the child’s time preference score, so that a greater age gap reduces 
the parent-child preference elasticity. For example, this elasticity is 0.15 if the parents are 20 
years older than their children, but only 0.12 when the gap is 30 years. This elasticity is higher 
for three-generation families (0.19). The elasticities are only little reduced by the introduction 
of other control variables, although again the explanatory power of the regression rises 
(increasing by a factor of two). 
Last, concerning family altruism, the impact of parents’ attitudes, perhaps surprisingly, 
seems somewhat weaker, notably relative to that for time preference. The estimated value of 
the coefficient on parents’ preferences is 0.10: very altruistic parents (with a score of +12) 
have children with altruism scores two points higher than parents who are very egotistical 
(with a score of -10). In elasticity terms, a parent with an altruism score one point over the 
mean for their generation has children with altruism scores that are 0.07 points higher than the 
mean of theirs. Again, the age difference between the two generations mitigates the 
intergenerational link in altruism: this is 0.10 for young parents (with an age gap of 20 years) 
and 0.06 for older parents (with a 30-year age gap). When we restrict the sample to children 
who themselves have children, the elasticity between the parents’ and the children’s scores is 
significantly larger, at 0.13. Controlling for the difference in ages, we obtain a score of 0.16 
for the 20-year age gap and 0.13 for the 30-year age gap. As before, a greater age gap 
between parents and their children weakens the similarity in their preferences. The 
introduction of other characteristics (such as income and education) as control variables does 
not change these results qualitatively. 
We therefore have strong evidence of a preference correlation between parents and their 
children. This correlation seems larger for risk attitudes (where the intergenerational elasticity 
is between 0.19 and 0.26) than for time preferences (between 0.12 and 0.19) and particularly 
than for altruism (between 0.07 and 0.14). It is of interest to compare these figures to those for 
the intergenerational correlation in other characteristics. These are presented in Table 4. 
Controlling for the difference in age, the intergenerational elasticity of labour income is 
0.27 and that of household permanent income 0.17.13 Having a parent who is a graduate 
increases the probability that the child be a graduate by 17.4 percentage points (relative to the 
average probability of 57%), with an analogous figure for a post-graduate degree or having 
attended a “grande école” of 16.6 percentage points (relative to the average probability of 
9%). The probability that the children hold risky assets is also 19.4 percentage points higher if 
their parents hold them too (relative to the average figure for holding risky assets of around 
                                                
13 The way in which household permanent income is constructed is explained below. 
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30%). This correlation is reduced, but is still significant (at 14.5 percentage points), when we 
also control for the differences in permanent income and education between the two 
generations. Home ownership also seems to be transmitted from parents to children, being 
around 14.4 percentage points higher for the children when their parents own their own 
homes (controlling for age, permanent income, and education). 
The intergenerational elasticity of wealth between parents and their children is around 
0.22. This figure, which is lower than those often found in the literature, can be explained by 
the fact that we observe both generations at the same date, and therefore at very different 
positions in the life cycle, and in particular before any inheritances are received.14 Arrondel & 
Grange (2006) note that at that time of death (and thus at the time of inheritances) the 
elasticity between the wealth of sons and their fathers is much higher, at around 0.45. The 
same phenomenon can be observed in the US: Charles & Hurst (2003) produce a figure of 
0.37 for the intergenerational elasticity of wealth between two coexisting generations, while 
Menchik (1979) calculates the same figure to be around 0.70 comparing the estates of 
children and their parents. 
We now turn our attention to the nature of this wealth relationship between generations, 
to try to explain why parents and their children have similar wealth profiles over the life 
cycle. 
 
IV. The Wealth Correlation between Generations 
As noted above, Charles & Hurst (2003) obtain a figure of 0.37 for the intergenerational 
elasticity of wealth between two coexisting generations, controlling for their difference in age. 
Around half of this elasticity is explained by the simple correlation with permanent incomes 
of parents and their children. The analogous figure for the composition of the wealth of the 
two generations, which is supposed to represent their savings propensities, is about one-third 
of the elasticity.15 Controlling for both variables at the same time explains two-thirds of the 
correlation in wealth between parents and children, with other variables (such as education, 
and past and future transfers) contributing much less. 
                                                
14 The "3 generations" survey of the CNAV in 1992 is the only French database which allows us to make this 
comparison. This survey covers one thousand families with three coexisting generations, with the key respondent 
aged between 49 and 53, where each generation (parents, key respondents, and their children) were separately 
interviewed (see Attias-Donfut, 1995). We thus have the same information for three different cohorts, notably 
regarding their wealth. For the key respondents and their parents, (1 213 observations, with the parents being 
aged between 66 and 94), the intergenerational elasticity of wealth (correcting for the difference in age) is only 
0.13. For the key respondents and their children (1 322 observations, with the children being aged between 19 
and 36), who are closer in age to our sample, this elasticity is 0.16. 
15 It is possible that correlation between wealth composition and the intergenerational elasticity reflect reverse 
causality, as portfolio choice theory suggests that the composition of wealth depends on the level of wealth. In 
order to evaluate the importance of preferences in determining wealth, it may well be preferable to have a direct 
measure of the former, as is our case here. 
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Charles and Hurst then ask how the remaining third of the correlation can be explained, 
and consider that it in part represents individual preferences. They appeal to a sub-sample of 
their data for which they have relative risk-aversion scores for the parents and their children 
using the approach of Barsky et al. (1997) described above. However, these risk preferences 
only explain a very small part of the intergenerational elasticity. 
In this section we carry out the same analysis as Charles and Hurst on French data which 
contains a much wider variety of preference information. These measures, particularly with 
respect to risk, will be shown to be more relevant to wealth behaviours than those derived 
uniquely from the approach in Barsky et al. (Arrondel & Masson, 2008). 
 
IV.1. The Intergenerational Elasticity of Wealth 
To calculate the wealth elasticity between parents and children (corrected for age effects), 
we estimate the following regression:16 
   (1) 
where Wf and Wp are respectively the logarithms of household wealth for the child (f) and the 
parent (p), , , and  are quadratic terms in age for the parent and the 
child, and  corresponds to the error term. 
The OLS estimation of equation (1) produces an elasticity of children’s wealth relative to 
that of their parents of 0.22, with an associated t-statistic of over 4.5. Parents who have wealth 
1% greater than the mean of their generation have children with wealth 0.22% greater than the 
mean of theirs. The explanatory power (R2) of this regression is 23%, so that the correlation 
between the wealth of parents and children, corrected for age effects, is 0.49. This means that 
parents’ wealth explains one quarter of the variation in their children’s wealth, once the 
difference in age is taken into account. Consequently, three-quarters of the variation in 
children’s wealth must be explained by other factors. 
The same conclusion can be inferred from the intergenerational wealth mobility matrix 
once age effects are controlled for, as shown in Table 5.17 Here 37% of parents in the first 
quartile of the wealth distribution have children in the same wealth quartile. However, this 
                                                
16 Equation (1) results from the functional form that we hypothesise between the level of wealth, , and the 
life-cycle position, . If we imagine that each generation’s wealth is described by a quadratic relationship 
in age, , where  denotes wealth corrected for age effects, it is then easy to show 
that the correlation between  and  is described an equation such as (1). Alternative functional forms 
were tested (such as third-degree polynomials), and produced similar qualitative results to those in Table 6. 
17 We construct this mobility matrix by estimating a wealth equation as a quadratic function of age for each 
generation. The residuals from these regressions represent wealth levels corrected for age. We then cut these 
residuals up into quartiles; the intersection of the distribution of quartiles produces Table 5. 
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similarity is by no means inevitable: 22% of children of the poorest parents end up in the top 
quartile of the wealth distribution. Equally, 31% of "rich kids" are also rich themselves, but 
the mirror image of this social climbing is the 16% of rich kids who end up in the lowest 
quartile of the wealth distribution.  
 
IV.2. The Constituents of the Intergenerational Elasticity of Wealth 
To evaluate the factors behind the intergenerational correlation in wealth detailed above, 
we re-estimate equation (1) including, for parents and their children, a number of other 
individual characteristics, included in the X vector below: 
 (2) 
These parental variables will likely influence children’s wealth via the intergenerational 
correlations in variables other than wealth. These are the correlations that we described in the 
previous section. 
The relationship between the elasticity in the simple model (1) and that including other 
explanatory variables (2) can be written as: 
       (3) 
where the coefficients and  denote the relationships (estimated by OLS) between 
parental wealth and the other explanatory variables for parents and children respectively. 
Equation (3) assumes that the other correlations between the explanatory variables are zero. 
For example, if the income of parents is positively correlated with the wealth of both the 
parents and that of their children, then the size of the intergenerational elasticity will fall once 
parents’ income is controlled for in the regression.18 If the introduction of parent 
characteristics produces a value of  that is lower than that of , we can conclude that these 
parental characteristics explain part of the “crude” intergenerational elasticity estimated in 
equation (1).  
We also introduce a number of characteristics of the children which are likely to affect 
their wealth, such as education. If these child variables are correlated positively (negatively) 
with their parents’ wealth, then the size of the estimated elasticity will fall (rise), and we can 
again evaluate the portion of the intergenerational elasticity which is explained by individual 
characteristics. 
                                                
18 It is entirely possible that the intergenerational wealth elasticity in equation (2) be higher than that in equation 
(1). This depends entirely on the sign of the direct and indirect effects of the variables on children’s wealth in 
equation (3). For example, if parents’ income increases their own wealth positively but reduces that of their 
children, then  will be greater than . 
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The variables included in equation (2) for both generations are permanent income, 
education, and preferences over risk and time, as well as any inter vivos donations already 
given by the parents. These four characteristics are key in explaining savings behaviour in 
standard theory (see above). To what extent do they explain the intergenerational correlation 
in wealth? 
Wealth may simply be transferred from parents to children, which is why we control for 
donations in equation (2). As we do not measure the exact amounts transferred, we include a 
simple dummy variable for such transfers having taken place. 
The introduction of the permanent income of parents and children in this equation picks 
up a number of different phenomena. The first is a direct effect of the child’s human capital 
on her savings rate. Further, under an imperfect capital market, the permanent income of 
parents may allow them to guarantee their credit-constrained children’s loans. Last, the 
intergenerational correlation in income may also reflect the transmission of certain work-
related values. 
Parents and children may therefore have similar wealth profiles due to similarity in their 
preferences which act on the three principal causes of savings: consumption-smoothing over 
the life cycle, as a precaution in the face of uncertainty, and wealth transmission to one’s 
children. The previous section showed that these preferences seem to be at least partly 
inherited from one’s parents.19 
Permanent labour income for each generation is calculated from a labour income 
regression including a number of socio-economic control variables: age, education, social 
class of the household head, town size, marital status, expectations of future household 
income, and income risk.20 Education is measured in six levels: primary, secondary, 
baccalauréat, graduate, and post-graduate or grandes–écoles. 
Table 6 decomposes the intergenerational wealth correlation into its constituent parts. The 
first column presents the value of the elasticity between the wealth of parents and their 
children, estimated from equation (2) and controlling for a number of other parent and child 
characteristics. The second column then shows the percentage of the elasticity which is 
explained by the different control variables. The third column lists the additional percentages 
explained by the control variables after controlling for the difference in age and permanent 
income between the generations. Finally, the variance explained by the different 
specifications is shown in column 4. 
                                                
19 Note that we assimilate household preferences to those of the individual respondent. Previous work has shown 
(Arrondel & Masson, 2008) that the correlation in savings preferences between partners is relatively strong (at 
around 0.40). 
20 As labour income is measured in bands, we use ordered probit estimation, from which we calculate predicted 
values. 
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As noted above, the estimation of equation (1) produces a value for the intergenerational 
elasticity of wealth, before inheritances and controlling for the difference in age, of 0.217. 
This figure appears at the top of column 1. Controlling for the permanent income of both 
parents and children in equation (2) reduces this figure by over 40%, to 0.125. The 
intergenerational correlation in wealth therefore picks up something more than just 
correlations in lifecycle resources.  
In line 4 of Table 6, controlling for parents’ and children’s education reduces this 
elasticity to 0.171, which is a drop of 21.2% (as shown in column 2). This lower elasticity 
value could reflect the correlation between parents’ wealth and the education of both the 
parents and their children. Line 5 shows that pre-existing donations explain 13.4% of the 
elasticity. Last, controlling for the preferences of both parents and children reduces this 
elasticity figure to 0.174, which represents a fall of about 20% from the initial figure. 
To evaluate the way in which these different variables affect the intergenerational wealth 
elasticity, it is useful to distinguish their direct effects from any indirect effects that work 
through permanent income. This is what we do in the bottom panel of Table 6. For example, 
the first line of this bottom panel shows the joint effect of age, permanent income and 
education. The last two variables explain 48% of the intergenerational correlation in wealth. 
By comparing the figure when age, education and permanent income are controlled for to that 
when only age and permanent income are controlled for, we can see that elasticity drops from 
0.125 to 0.113. As such, independently of its effect on permanent income, education explains 
about 5% of the elasticity (see column 3). The majority of the previous effect of education 
then works via permanent income. By way of contrast, the effect of pre-existing donations 
and preferences remain substantial even after permanent income is controlled for, with each 
explaining around 13% of the elasticity.  
The last line of Table 6 shows what happens when we include all of the explanatory 
variables at the same time. The intergenerational elasticity of wealth drops to 6%, suggesting 
that most of the observed correlation is picking up permanent income, pre-existing donations, 
education, and savings preferences. The one-quarter of the effect that remains thus reflects 
other transmission mechanisms (although it is worth noting that this “residual” correlation is 
no longer significantly different from zero). 
 
V. Conclusion 
The influence of parents’ wealth on that of their children has often been noted, even 
controlling for observable individual characteristics. This "poids d'Anchise" has been 
documented in both the riskiness of portfolios and the demand for life insurance policies, as 
well as in the amounts of wealth passed on in different ways (gifts, donations, inheritances). 
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Explanations of these intergenerational correlations have appealed to the intergenerational 
transfer of information or financial education, or of attitudes towards saving. 
Empirical tests of these different hypotheses are scarce, due to the lack of suitable data. 
We require information on the savings behaviour of both parents and their children. In 
addition, testing the intergenerational transmission of preferences necessitates data on both 
wealth and preferences across two generations, which is rarer still. In this article, we are able 
to use data which contains just this information: an original French dataset collected by 
DELTA and TNS-Sofres in 2002, in which we have wealth and preference information for a 
sample of parents and their children. 
The risk-aversion and time preference of parents and their children are indeed 
significantly correlated, but far from perfectly so: the preference elasticities of children with 
respect to those of their parents are around 0.15 for time preference and family altruism, and 
0.25 for risk-aversion. 
The analogous wealth elasticity in this sample is around 0.22. This figure is corrected for 
the differences in age, and reflects the wealth of two co-existing generations, i.e. before the 
greatest part of wealth transmission takes place. This latter explains the relatively small value 
of this elasticity, compared to that of legacies (which is around 0.45). 
Over 40% of this wealth elasticity is explained by the simple correlation with the 
permanent incomes of the two generations. Introduced one at a time, education and 
preferences each account for one-fifth, and pre-existing intergenerational transfers for 13%. 
The contribution of savings preferences is estimated to be around 13% once permanent 
income is controlled for. The similarity of savings preferences thus represents a non-
negligible part of the similarity of wealth between generations. However, it is far from being 
the only cause of this similarity, and previous work which has appealed to (unobserved) 
similarities in tastes across generations may have oversold their explanatory power. The root 
of the main part of intergenerational wealth transmission does not lie in the similarity of 
preferences. 
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Appendix: The measure of risk and time preferences 
 
We here briefly present the method used to construct the scores in the 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres 
survey. The list of questions used to construct these scores was the same for the first-phase 
respondents (aged between 35 and 55) and both their parents and their children.  
A1. Risk Attitudes 
We have 32 questions in the survey to measure risk attitudes, of which 27 were deemed to be 
pertinent for the first-phase respondents using Cronbach’s alpha (Arrondel & Masson, 2007). In the 
construction of the risk score for this sample (Arrondel & Masson, 2007, Appendix F), the most 
pertinent question turned out to be that on taking precautions in case the weather turned out nasty 
(55.9% of this sample took such precautions: see Table A2). Immediately following this in importance 
were questions on gambling (one-armed bandits and the casino). Buying plane or train tickets well in 
advance was also correlated with the risk score (19.3 % of the sample do so, whereas 8% buy them at 
the last minute). Other significant questions are the desire to inculcate either risk-taking or prudent 
attitudes in young children (2.6% of the sample incite them to take risks), parking in no-parking zones 
(61.7% never do so, and 10.6% do so sometimes). 
The value of Cronbach’s alpha for these questions is 0.51. This score thus exhibits an acceptable 
degree of consistency, even though some psychometricians would find this value low. Arrondel & 
Masson (2008) show that Cronbach’s alpha is only one of a number of validity scores for preference 
measures, and that the scoring method should also meet other criteria (principal components analysis, 
déterminants des scores, pouvoir explicatif des mesures...). They also note that the relative weakness 
of Cronbach’s alpha scores partly reflects the multidimensional nature of the risk score (both day-to-
day choices and fundamental long-term choices), which multidimensionality is however essential for 
the explanation of savings behaviours. 
Theoretically, the maximum score for someone who is risk-averse is +23, and the minimum score 
for a risk-lover is -29. In our survey, the observed values for this score are found between -13 and +14 
for the first-phase respondents, between -5 and +17 for their parents, and between -10 and +13 for 
their children. The distribution of risk scores for the three generations is presented in Figure 1a. 
Unsurprisingly, younger generations are more risk-loving than older generations. The mean risk score 
is 4.0 for the first-phase respondents (with a median value of 4), as against 3.2 for their children (3), 
and 6.2 for their parents (6). 
A2. Time Preference 
For time preference, 16 questions out of the initial set of 18 (see Table A3) were retained. For 
first-phase respondents, the questions covering long-term and family concerns were the most 
important for the construction of this score (Arrondel & Masson, 2007, Appendix F): sensitivity to 
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environmental problems, (79.2% say that they are), the desire to inculcate savings attitudes in one’s 
children (which we find in 91% of respondents), and having received such an education from one’s 
own parents (75.4% say that their parents gave them such a savings education). Also important, but 
less so, were the fact of buying plane or train tickets in advance (19.3% do so well in advance, and 
20.1% arrive well before their plane or train), Achilles’ dilemma (9.6% prefer a sacrifice today in 
order to live longer, 9.5% want to enjoy life today, and the rest are somewhere between these two 
extremes), and a healthy life by playing sports (25.9% play regularly, but 54.4% never play). The 
Cronbach’s alpha score for these questions is 0.40. 
The maximum score that an individual can obtain is +15, and the minimal value for someone who 
is a long-term planner is -11. The distribution of these time-preference scores is shown in Figure 1b. 
This score varies between -10 and +13 for first-phase respondents, from -9 to +6 for their parents, and 
from -7 to +7 for their children. There is no particularly striking generational difference in the 
distribution of time-preference scores: in particular the average values of these scores are not 
significantly different by generation (-1.12 for the children, -1.53 for first-phase respondents, and 1.27 
for the children). 
With respect to altruism, the maximum score for the most altruistic individual (from the seven 
questions retained from the eight initial questions)21 is +12, and the minimum value is -12 (See Table 
A4). The distribution of these altruism scores is shown in Figure 1c. The recorded values of this score 
vary between -12 and +11 for first-phase respondents, between -9 and +12 for their parents, and 
between -10 and +9 for the children. The figures show that it is the parents who are the most altruistic: 
over 30% of them have a score of over 3, against 20% of their children. The same pattern is observed 
in the average altruism score, which is 0.11 for children and the first-phase respondents, but 0.99 for 
the parents. 
 
                                                
21 Given the relatively restricted number of questions available to create this score, the altruism measure is 
sometimes coded over five values only (from +2 to -2). The questions used to create this score are described in 
Table A4. 
Table 1 
The Parents-Children Sample
Variables
Children Parents
Age 33,79 58,88
Labour Earnings (Mean) 25974,42 27652,00
(Standard Deviation) (14 294) (14 972)
Baccalauréat or more (%) 56,80 28,60
Higher Education (%) 9,30 5,90
Wealth (Mean) 81417,00 192221,76
(Standard Deviation) (159 291) (588 118)
Financial Wealth (Mean) 14565,37 43284,00
(Standard Deviation) (42 290) (111 976)
Home Owners or Buyers (%) 43,90 68,60
Percentage Holding Risky Assets 30,50 27,70
Number of Observations
Source: DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey,2002
440,00
Table 2a
The intergenerational correlation in preference scores
Risk-aversion
Time 
Preference
Family altruism
Parents and 
Children
0,22 0,15 0,11
Three-generation 
families
0,30 0,19 0,19
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
Table 2b
Risk-aversion
Time 
Preference
Family altruism
Parents and 
Children
0,16 0,10 0,08
Three-generation 
families
0,22 0,13 0,14
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
Table 2c
Relative risk-
aversion of 
children (%)
Very Weak Weak Medium Strong Total Total (%)
Very Weak 16,7 9,5 5,2 7,8 28 8,2
Weak 27,8 26,2 23,7 25,3 86 25,2
Medium 22,2 40,5 32,0 30,1 106 31,1
Strong 33,3 23,8 39,2 36,7 121 35,5
Total 36 42 97 166 341 100,0
Total (%) 10,6 12,3 28,4 48,7 100,0
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
Note: The !2-statistic is 8.83 with 9 degrees of freedom (critical value = 0.45).
Relative risk-aversion of parents (%)
Correlations which are significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
Correlations which are significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
The intergenerational correlation in preference scores
Relative risk-aversion of parents and their children
Table 3a
Risk-aversion
Time 
Preference
Family 
altruism
Parents and Children
0,193 0,132 0,073
Standard Error (0.048) (0.053) (0.043)
R2 (%) 4,8 4,5 2,9
Three-generation 
families 0,238 0,185 0,128
Standard Error (0.062) (0.074) (0.061)
R2 (%) 9,0 8,8 3,6
Table 3b
Parents and Children
0,196 0,120 0,066
Standard Error (0.049) (0.055) (0.046)
R2 (%) 6,0 9,0 5,8
Three-generation 
families 0,255 0,148 0,127
Standard Error (0.063) (0.076) (0.063)
R2 (%) 13,6 18,7 9,3
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
The elasticity of children’s preferences relative to those of their parents 
(corrected for differences in age)
The elasticities which are significant at the 5% level are in bold; those significant
at the 10% level are in italics. These correlations take into account the correction
for age.
The elasticities which are significant at the 5% level are in bold; those significant
at the 10% level are in italics. These correlations take into account the correction
for age, education and permanent income.
The elasticity of children’s preferences relative to those of their parents 
(corrected for differences in age, education and permanent income)
Table 4
Dependent variables (for children)
Estimated coefficient on the 
corresponding variable for the 
parents (standard error)
Wealth (in log, controlling for age) 0.217 (0.046)
Labour income (in log, controlling for age) 0.270 (0.049)
Permanent income (in log, controlling for age) 0.170 (0.047)
Education higher than the Bac (binary variable, 
controlling for age)
0.174 (0.053)
Post-graduate education or Grandes-Ecoles (binary 
variable, controlling for age)
0.166 (0.061)
Holding risky assets (binary variable, controlling for 
age)
0.194 (0.047)
Holding risky assets (binary variable, controlling for 
age, education and permanent income)
0.145 (0.050)
Homeowner (binary variable, controlling for age) 0.144 (0.045)
Homeowner (binary variable, controlling for age, 
education and permanent income)
0.137 (0.046)
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
The intergenerational correlation in income, education, wealth and portfolios
Note: This table shows the results of regressions of the child's characteristic, using the parent's value of the
same characteristic as an explanatory variable. All regression include quadratic terms in age for both children
and their parents. The wealth and income regressions are estimated by OLS; the other (binary) variables are
estimated via linear probability models.
Table 5
The intergenerational wealth mobility matrix (corrected for age effects)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
1st quartile 37 28 18 16
2nd quartile 23 28 26 23
3rd quartile 17 24 29 30
4th quartile 22 20 27 31
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
Quartiles of parents' wealth corrected for age
Quartiles of children's 
wealth corrected for age
Note: These figures are corrected for age via log wealth regressions including age and age-squared as explanatory variables.
The residuals from this regression correspond to wealth corrected for life-cycle effects; these residuals are then split up into
quartiles, and crossed with the analogous measure for the other generation.
Table 6
Decomposing the intergenerational elasticity of wealth
Estimated 
elasticity (standard 
error)
Percentage of the 
elasticity 
explained (%)
Additional 
percentage of 
the elasticity 
explained (%)
Adjusted R2
Wealth elasticity controlling for age 0.217 (0.046) 0,229
Wealth elasticity controlling for age and:
Permanent income 0.125 (0.051) 42,4 0,332
Education 0.171 (0.049) 21,2 0,248
Pre-existing donations 0.188 (0.047) 13,4 0,260
Preferences (risk aversion, time preference and 
altruism)
0.174 (0.048) 19,8 0,266
Wealth elasticity controlling for age, 
permanent income and:
Education 0.113 (0.052) 47,9 5,4 0,332
Pre-existing donations 0.095 (0.051) 56,2 13,8 0,346
Preferences (risk aversion, time preference and 
altruism)
0.096 (0.052) 55,8 13,4 0,348
Wealth elasticity controlling for age and all 
other variables.
0.059 (0.052) 72,8 0,372
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
First-phase 
respondentss Their Parents
Their 
Children
Sex
Male 49,7 40,0 38,0
Female 50,3 60,0 62,0
Age
Under 25 26,3
25-29 44,9
30-34 24,1
35-39 29,2 4,8
40-44 26,6
45-49 18,6
50-54 25,4 1,5
55-59 6,3
60-64 21,5
65-69 28,3
70-74 22,0
74-79 15,2
80 or over 5,2
Marital status
Married 62,3 64,7 35,2
Living as a couple 10,0 1,6 30,1
Single 16,0 2,1 32,2
Divorced 9,8 6,8 2,5
Widowed 1,9 24,7
Education
No education 0,2
Primary education 4,7 29,3
Secondary education 4,8 11,2 0,8
Professional education 34,0 20,7 16,0
Baccalaureat 23,6 21,3 27,9
Graduate studies 11,8 4,3 18,1
Post graduate studies (first degree) 7,0 4,3 9,3
Post graduate studies (second degree) 7,3 4,8 20,3
Post graduate studies (third degree) 6,6 4,3 7,6
Individual income
Less than 14 400 € (less than 96 000 FF) 33,6 39,7 50,9
From 14 400 to 18 299 € (96 000 to 120 000 FF) 24,6 17,3 27,4
From 18 300 to 27 399 € (121 000 to 180 000 FF) 25,8 22,4 15,0
From 27 400 to 36 499 € (181 000 to 240 000 FF) 9,9 13,4 5,6
From 36 500 to 45 699 € (241 000 to 300 000 FF) 3,1 4,5 0,9
45 700 € or more (300 000 FF or more) 3,0 2,8 0,4
Number of observations 2 460 199 241
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
Table A1
Structure of the samples
Risk-loving 
(%)
Risk-averse 
(%)
 (-)  (+)
Consumption/leisure/travel
SR73: Parks in no-parking zones (Yes = -1; No = +1; Other = 0) Q7 6 27,7 61,7 10,6
Health/health risks/life expectancy
SR57: Precautionary visits to the doctor or dentist (Yes = +1; No = 0) Q5 14 38,2 60,2
SR68: Non-compulsory vaccinations (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) Q6 27 15,8 41,0 43,2
SR70: Wears seatbelt, respects speed limit (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) Q7 12 2,1 12,2 85,7
SR71: Sacrifice today in order to live longer (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) Q7 7 9,5 9,6 80,9
SR61: Careful to keep in shape (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0 )
Q
6
1
8,8 7,9 83,3
SR69e: Booster vaccination for ones children (Yes = 0; No = -1) Q69e 24 5,0 95,0
Work/income/career
SR4: Looks for novelty and responsibility in a job (Yes = -1; Other = 0) Q4 17 19,4 80,6
SR3a: Has taken risks in their career (Yes = -1; No = 0 ) Q3 13 37,3 62,7
SR3b: Leisure behaviour represents a potential risk for career  (Yes = -1; No = 0) Q3 20 9,5 90,5
SR3c: Risky job changes (Yes = -1; No = 0) Q3 10 30,7 69,3
SR15: Recommends that friends and family take risks in their careers (Yes = -1; No = +1; 
Other = 0) 
Q
1 11 8,8 7,9 83,3
SR8: Would change economic sector in the face of substantial economic risk Q8 15 50,0 50,0
Retirement
SR30: Worried that might end their life in a retirement home (Yes =  +1; No = 0) Q3 26 66,5 33,5
SR32: Saves in order to avoid ending their life in a retirement home (Yes  =  +1; No = 0) 
Q
3
2
23 78,5 21,5
SR33: Would prefer lower social security contributions against a less generous pension 
(Yes, without precautionary saving = -1; No, too risky = +1; Other = 0)  
Q
3
3
22 1,4 28,7 69,9
Family/Intergenerational Transfers
SR42a: "Marriage is an insurance policy" (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) Q4 16 17,4 13,7 68,9
SR42b: "Choosing a partner is risky" (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) Q4 4,9 23,1 72,0
SR42c: "You can't sign up for marriage without testing it first" (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other 
= 0) 
Q
4
2
8,5 24,4 67,1
SR42d: "Having children is an insurance policy for ones old age" (No = -1; Yes = +1; 
Other = 0)
Q
4 80,2 19,8
SR42e: "The decision to have children is a risky one" (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) Q4 18,5 12,7 68,8
SR42f: The decision to have children is a lifelong commitment (No = -1; Yes = 0)
Q
4
2
25 5,0 95,0
SR43: Wishes to protect their spouse financially in case of their own death (No = -1; Yes 
= 0)  
Q
4
3
21 6,8 93,2
SR45a: Constantly keeps watch over their children (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0)
Q
4
5
19 10,9 33,0 56,1
SR45b: Would encourage their children to take risks (Yes, definitely = -1; No = +1; Other 
= 0) 
Q
4
5
5 2,6 28,9 68,5
Gambling
SR72a: Bets on horses (very or fairly often=-1, rarely=0, never=1) Q7 9 4,5 80,4 15,1
SR72b: Plays the lottery (very often=-1,  fairly often or rarely=0, never=1) Q7 18 8,9 61,2 29,9
SR72c: Plays slot machines (very or fairly often=-1, rarely=0, never=1) Q7 2 1,2 77,4 21,4
SR72d: Bets at the casino (very or fairly often=-1, rarely=0, never=1) Q7 3 0,3 90,2 9,5
Other
SR77: Buys transport tickets well in advance (No = -1; well in advance = +1; a little in 
advance = 0) 
Q
7
7
4 8,0 19,3 72,7
SR78: Turns up well in time for trains and planes (No = -1; well in time = +1; a little in 
advance = 0)
Q
7
8
8 4,2 20,1 75,7
SR81: Takes precautions in case the weather turns out nasty (No = -1; Yes = 0) 
Q
8
1
1 42,7 55,9 1,4
Number of questions 27
Cronbach's alpha 0,51
Number of observations
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
2 460
Neutral 
(%)Nature of the question
Table A2
A. Response frequencies and score construction for the first-phase respondents: risk-aversion
Rank in 
the score 
Table A3
Lives from 
day to day 
(%)
Farsighted 
(%)
 (+)  (-)
Consumption/leisure/travel
ST76: Wishes to enjoy windfalls as quickly as possible (Yes = +1; No = 0) 14 24,7 75,3
ST77: Buys transport tickets well in advance (No = -1; well in advance = 
+1; a little in advance = 0) 
5 8,0 19,3 72,7
ST78: Turns up well in time for trains and planes (No = -1; well in time = 
+1; a little in advance = 0)
7 4,2 20,1 75,7
ST79:Would put holidays off for one year in order to increase their duration 
(No = +1; Yes, with at most only one or two more days= -1; Other = 0) 15 21,4 17,5 61,1
Health/health risks/life expectancy
ST71: Sacrifice today in order to live longer (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) 6 9,5 9,6 80,9
ST61: Plays sport or goes to the gym (Regularly= -1; Never= +1; 
Occasionally= 0 ) 8 54,4 25,9 19,7
Work/income/career
ST4: Favours free time in choice of job (Yes = 1; No = 0) 12 31,5 68,5
ST14: Would prefer National Service to be as short as possible, rather than a 
longer service which is spread out over time(No = +1; Yes = 0) 39,7 60,3
Retirement
ST30: Worried that might end their life in a retirement home (Yes =  +1; No 
= 0) 16 66,5 33,5
ST32: Would have trouble in paying for a retirement home (Yes if saved 
more= -1; Yes without saving more= +1; No = 0) 9 47,0 11,4 41,6
ST33: Would prefer early retirement against a lower pension after the age of 
60 (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0) 13 1,4 86,3 12,3
Family/Intergenerational Transfers
ST42d: "Having children is an insurance policy for ones old age" (No = -1; 
Yes = +1; Other = 0) 80,2 19,8
ST42f: The decision to have children is a lifelong commitment (No = -1; 
Yes = 0) 11 6,5 93,5
ST43: Wishes to protect their spouse financially in case of their own death 
(No = -1; Yes = 0) 4 6,8 93,2
ST44: My parents tried to teach me to save money (Yes=-1; No=+1; 
Other=0) 3 22,9 75,4 1,7
ST45c: We should teach children and teenagers how to save money (Yes = -
1; No = +1; Other=0) 2 6,4 90,9 2,8
Other
ST82: Aware of environmental problems (No = +1; Other = 0) 1 20,8 79,2
ST84: Ready to sacrifice their standard of living to leave the world in good 
shape (Yes, very much so = -1; No = +1; Yes, to an extent = 0) 10 15,4 42,3 42,3
Number of questions 16
Cronbach's alpha 0,40
Number of observations
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
2 460
A. Response frequencies and score construction for the first-phase respondents: time preference
Nature of the question
Rank in 
the 
score 
Neutral (%)
Table A4
Egoist 
(%)
Altruist 
(%)
 (-)  (+)
SA42f: The decision to have children is a lifelong commitment (No = -
1; Yes = 0)
Q
4
2
6 5,0 96,6 1,40
SA43: Wishes to protect their spouse financially in case of their own 
death (No = -1; Yes = 0)  
Q
4
3
7 6,8 93,2 -
SA49: Should leave to our children as much as we received ourselves 
(Yes = +1; No = -1; Other = 0)(2)
Q
4
9
3 72,4 25,2 2,4
SA50: Inheritance behaviour inspired by that of my parents (Yes = +1; 
No = -1) 
Q
5
0
4 52,9 47,1
SA51b: Parents should spend their money as they wish, even if it means 
leaving no legacy (Yes = +1; No = -1; Other = 0)
Q
5
1
b
1 87,9 11,1 1,0
SA51e: Thinks that is a good thing that parents make sacrifices for their 
children (Yes = +1; No = -1; Other = 0)
Q
5
1
2 92,4 6,3 1,3
SA52a: Would favour lower inheritance taxes on transmission to blood 
relatives (Yes = +1; No = -1; Other = 0)
Q
5
2
5,5 85,9 8,6
SA53: Is in favour of the freedom to bequeath (Yes = +1; No = -1; 
Other = 0)
Q
5
3
5 46,5 52,1 1,3
Number of questions 7
Cronbach's alpha
Number of observations
Source: The 2002 DELTA-TNS-Sofres Survey
2 460
A. Response frequencies and score construction for the first-phase respondents: altruism
Nature of the question Rank in the score 
Neutral 
(%)
0,37
